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Abstract 
Motivated by a strong degree of hysteresis in the stock of monetization observed after the 
end of hyperinflations, I provide a cash-and-credit model in which the use of money exhibits 
some persistence because individuals can establish long-lasting credit relationships. This 
feature helps to account for the main stylized facts of extreme hyperinflations and reconcile 
some conflicting views on their causes, development and end without departing from rational 
expectations. Unlike the existing literature, I show that when hysteresis is possible, an 
orthodox fiscal-monetary reform that successfully stops a speculative hyperinflation may not 
be sufficient to prevent it. 
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1 Introduction
In this paper I provide a theoretical explanation for the main stylized facts observed during hyperina-
tionary processes as those experienced by some European, Latin-American and transition countries in the
1920s, 80s and 90s, respectively. These episodes often display a common set of facts, yet much of the
previous literature has followed a partial approach concentrating only on a reduced number of stylized
features, as stressed by Bental and Eckstein (1990) and, more recently, by Marcet and Nicolini (2003).
Indeed, some of the most inuential partial explanations, when combined together, yield a picture that
does not resemble what we actually observe in real economies. A central contribution aimed here is to
present a simple rational-expectations general equilibrium model that potentially accommodates three of
the most inuential partial approaches -the scal root, the bubble explanation and the orthodox reform-
(described below), making them consistent with each other and with the empirical facts.
First, weak scal conditions that force the government to nance part of its expenses via money
injections (seigniorage) are usually thought to be an important factor behind hyperinations (the scal
root). On the one hand, explosive hyperinations often take place in countries in which seigniorage is
relatively high and, on the other, a drastic reduction in this source of funding is observed after every
successful stabilization. For instance, regarding the scal stance of some European countries in the
1920s, Sargent (1986; p. 45) observes that the governments of these countries (Hungary, Austria,
Poland, and Germany) resorted to the printing of new unbacked money to nance government decits.
This was done on such a scale that it led to a depreciation of the currencies of spectacular proportions.
(parentheses added). Although the exact intertemporal mechanisms linking ination and seigniorage
are likely to be rather complex, as shown by Sargent and Wallace (1981), the common proposition that
associates high ination to a high degree of scal-dominance in the implementation of monetary polices
remains basically uncontested.1
Second, for some students of these episodes, the lack of strong correlation between ination and
seigniorage over the course of some hyperinations suggests that they may well be driven just by ex-
pectations that, in equilibrium, are self-conrmed (the bubble explanation). This approach has received
a formal treatment under the rational expectations paradigm, among others, by Sargent and Wallace
(1987), and Bruno and Fischer (1990). In both cases, it is assumed a demand for real balances à la
Cagan (1956), which implies the existence of a hump-shaped ination-tax La¤er curve with two station-
ary ination rates (one low and one high) associated with a unique volume of seigniorage, and a
hyperination is interpreted as the economy moving from the vicinity of the low ination rate to the high
one. According to this view seigniorage is not the sole explanation for high ination, instead, private
expectations are thought to be the prime cause. However, in explaining the occurrence of a hyperination
as a bubble equilibrium along a standard La¤er curve, the degree of scal pressure does not play any
1Although there are some divergent views on this issue. For example, Loyo (2001) provides an explanation for the
hyperinationary bursts in Brazil in the 1980s and 90s using a cash-less model in which the volume of seigniorage is
negligible.
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signicant role. More on the contrary, as the economy moves towards the decreasing arm of the La¤er
curve, higher levels of seigniorage will result in lower ination rates. Still, such a possibility has also at-
tracted much attention in the empirical literature.2 For example, Imrohoroglu (1993), provides empirical
support for Sargent and Wallaces multiple-equilibria model using data from the German hyperination.
Third, for a wide class of rational-expectations economic models, including those in the tradition of
Cagan mentioned above, Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1983), and Nicolini (1996) have shown that the prospect of
a scal-monetary reform aimed at stabilizing the real value of the currency through a restrictive monetary
policy (the orthodox reform) is itself a su¢ cient condition to preclude a speculative hyperination, thus
making it di¢ cult to reconcile the idea of a hyperination as a rational-bubble equilibrium. Moreover,
once the possibility of a reform is introduced in a model with rational expectations and a Cagan-style
demand for money what one learns is that higher seigniorage is uniformly associated with more severe
disinationary processes. Yet, if anything is unambiguously true about hyperinations is that they are
always stopped. There is little doubt either that this is the result of the governments determination to
reform the scal-monetary mix, i.e. to implement deliberate and drastic scal and monetary measures
taken to end the hyperinations(Sargent 1986; p. 44).
Clearly, when combined together, these three partial views do not t each other. Yet, there have
been few attempts to provide a general explanation of hyperinations, including their causes, dynamics
and end. To the best of my knowledge, most of them consider models in which the preventive role of
an eventual reform, as the one outlined above, is not explicitly considered.3 Marcet and Nicolini (2003)
consider a baseline model similar to the one studied by Sargent and Wallace (1987) but assume that
individuals follow a backward-looking rule for forming expectations (quasi-rational learning). They show
that under some conditions on the learning rule the model is able to match most of the stylized facts.
Sargent et al. (2005) have recently provided econometric support for the ability of Marcet and Nicolinis
model to explain the time series of ination using data from several Latin-American countries. However,
as in this class of models individuals do not internalize the possibility of a future change in the policy-
regime when forming their expectations, the prospect of a reform is itself irrelevant for the dynamics of
the model.
Using the same Cagan-type model, Kiguel (1989) argues that a volume of seigniorage above the
maximum one in a steady-state ination-tax La¤er curve will unchain an explosive hyperination if the
money market does not clear instantaneously.4 Although he explicitly considers the implementation of
a reform as a device to stop the hyperination, the expectation of a reform does not have any e¤ect on
individuals decisions before its implementation either.
2Since, at least, the inuential work of Flood and Garber (1980), a large number of authors have tried to detect bubble-
components using data from hyperinationary economies. The results are mixed and the comparison across di¤erent studies
is not always easy, as there is a wide heterogeneity in the specication of the money demand function, the money supply
process, etc. For some recent contributions on this area see e.g. Blackburn and Sola (1996), and Hooker (2000), and the
references therein.
3Drazen and Helpman (1990) provide an exception since they explicitly model the e¤ects of an anticipated change of
regime. However, in order for their model to generate a hyperinationary path, an upward seigniorage-path is required.
Yet, as discussed below, this is not a common feature in hyperinationary episodes.
4Romer (2001) presents a simplied version of this model.
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The two models just mentioned provide a rationale for the scal root view, however at the cost of
neglecting the governments policy path followed beyond the current date. A di¤erent view is taken
by Bental and Eckstein (1990) and Paal (2000), since in these models the anticipation of a reform is
thought to be the cause of the hyperination. Bental and Eckstein explain the relatively low level of
monetization (i.e. the stock of real balances) observed for a long time after the end of a hyperination as
a consequence of a negative wealth e¤ect arising from the increase in income-taxes accompanying a scal-
monetary reform. Then they interpret a hyperination as the economy moving from a scenario of a high
demand for real money to a stationary one in which the stock of real balances remains low, in line with
a lower level of private wealth. Paal (2000), referring to the hyperinationary episode in Hungary in the
1940s, argues that a reform based on the stabilization of the ination rate without directly controlling
for a monetary aggregate may actually leave the economy prone to purely expectational-driven equilibria,
some of them hyperinationary, some others exhibiting a pronounced disination. Anticipation of such a
change in the monetary rule rather than a weak governments scal condition could have been, according
to this model, the true cause of the Hungarian hyperination.5
The approach followed here may be seen as a complement to the general explanations listed above,
for it shares some basic features with them, yet takes a di¤erent route. I do not impose ex ante any
special assumption on the current e¤ects of a future scal-monetary reform. Rather, I am concerned
with the conditions under which the prospect of an eventual reform exerts a preventive e¤ect. In this
sense, I build up a framework within which the e¤ectiveness of a reform to preclude the occurrence of a
hyperination arises as an endogenous outcome. To this aim, I formulate a rational-expectations model
whose cornerstone is its potential ability to display one of the most recurrent empirical facts in hyperin-
ationary economies, namely, a post-reform hysteresis-e¤ect in the demand for (national currency) real
balances. Referring to this phenomenon, Calvo and Végh (1992; p. 11) note that high ination forces
a gradual development of new nancial instruments [...] Creating new nancial products is costly and
requires a learning process. Once this investment has taken place, the public will continue using these
new nancial instruments even if ination falls.6
Along this line of reasoning, the model developed later features a gradual development of a non-
monetary nancial instrument whose initial adoption is costly but can be used even if ination falls.
There are several theoretical models in the previous literature designed to account for some of these
facts. For example, Ireland (1995), Sachs (1995) and Uribe (1997) all provide examples of economies
5This argument resembles the bubble explanation above, however with an important di¤erence. For instance, in Sargent
and Wallace (1987), the government directly sets a target for seigniorage at every period. Paal, on the contrary assumes
that at the time of the reform the government, by committing to a non-contingent ination target, leaves both the volume
of seigniorage and the supply of money indeterminate, very much like what we would observe when a central bank switches
from a rule based on the control of a monetary aggregate to one based on the control of the short-term interest rate,
as described in Sargent and Wallace (1975). Then, she associates the occurrence of an explosive hyperination to a
self-conrmed high volume of seigniorage at the precise time of the reform.
6A similar observation can be found in Dornbusch et al. (1990; p. 23-24): The distinction between movements along
the real money demand schedule and shifts in real money demand helps explain the actual dynamics of real balances during
an ination. The distinction may also explain why there are hysteresis e¤ ects. Once a new nancial product is in use, it
will continue to be used even if ination declines. [...] Financial institutions are not ready-made to accommodate the ight
from money. In the short run, households may hold more real balances than they will after alternative vehicles become
available or better known. In practice, this will look like adjustment lags, but it also reects the adjustments of nancial
institutions to the increased ination.
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in which a form of nancial innovation exhibits long-lasting e¤ects. However, to my knowledge, no
model of nancial innovation or currency substitution has been previously exploited to account for the
stylized e¤ects we are after, including an explosive ination-path and a sudden change of policy-regime.
Thus, a methodological contribution of the paper consists in bringing together these two strands of the
literature, a natural step after recognizing that the incentives to invest in nancial products not directly
subject to the ination-tax are probably highest when ination reaches several-digits values, and that
the most pronounced episodes of rapid demonetization and slow remonetization are observed during
hyperinationary episodes.
Specically, I model the demand for monetary balances as a version of Ireland (1995) cash- and credit-
goods environment. Households may acquire their desired consumption basket using either cash or credit.
However, credit requires the prior investment of some valuable resources for building up long-lasting
producer-shopper relationships which can be exploited for some time to avoid the inationary cost of
carrying cash.7 On the side of monetary supply, I follow the standard assumption of a government aiming
at collecting an exogenous and constant amount of seigniorage over a scal-dominance regime which is
possibly reversed at some future date by the implementation of a monetary-scal reform conducive to
a low-ination monetary-dominance regime.8 Private agents are assumed to be aware of the eventual
change of regime.
This simple formal set up provides a natural interpretation of the links among the scal roots of
hyperinations, their dynamics and termination and the relative role of expectations and fundamentals.
In particular, provided some mild conditions hold, the model exhibits up to three general classes of
potential equilibria over the scal-dominance regime. First, a unique low-ination equilibrium that arises
when the public expects a responsiblegovernment policy in the form of a combination of a low level
of decit-monetization and an early and/or restrictive reform. Second, a unique high- and increasing-
ination path that obtains in the opposite policy scenario (i.e. high seigniorage and late/insu¢ ciently
restrictive reform). Third, for some structural parameters and government policy choices lying in between
the two previous extreme cases, the model displays multiple equilibria, some of them hyperinationary,
whose realization hinges crucially on private expectations, this being a reection of the fact that a
seigniorage-based monetary policy allows for individual complementarities in the decision of investing in
the credit-technology.
Overall the main insights of the paper are two. First, on the theory side, the paper argues that
the practical relevance of the arguments put forward by Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1983), concerning the
7 I stick at the cash- versus credit-transactions parable for simplicity and without loss of generality. The basic arguments
can be extended to alternative forms of carrying out transactions that do not rely on the use of domestic money (e.g.
dollarization, barter, etc.)
8As further claried later, this is the standard assumption followed in the general approaches commented above, in
which no attempt to explain the government behavior (beyond that of a mechanic monetization of a portion of the decit)
is made. In another branch of the literature (see e.g. Albanesi 2006 and the references therein) the degree of scal pressure
on monetary policy is modelled explicitly as the outcome of a game between economic authorities and/or groups of interest.
Within this political-economy branch, Mondino et al. (1996) provide a model with some similarities to the one developed
here, since they allow for a mechanism of nancial innovation with log-lasting e¤ects. Yet, the questions they pose and
their methodology are di¤erent from the ones pursued here.
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e¤ectiveness of a future reform to rule out a hyperination, must be qualied in view of the empirical
evidence, for the presence of hysteresis suggests that the su¢ cient condition for the validity of their
arguments (i.e. the lack of causality running from past to future states along an equilibrium in which
the prospect of a reform is internalized by the households) may not hold in real economies. Indeed, in
an economy in which hysteresis is a true possibility, the conditions for an ex ante e¤ective reform are
likely to be much more complex than in the history-independent economy studied by those authors. This
observation will allow us to reconcile the three inuential views on hyperinationary processes described
above.
Second, by examining the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for a hyperination, the model o¤ers
some insights relevant for policy judgment. In particular, scal conditions are likely to play an important
role, as stressed by Marcet and Nicolini (2003) and Sargent et al. (2005). However, using a genuine
rational-expectations dynamic framework we learn that seigniorage over the scal-dominance regime,
while important, does not contain all the relevant scal-information, e.g. the horizon over which that
regime is implemented and the scal-monetary conditions prevailing after the reform are also likely to
bear a direct e¤ect on the conditions that determine whether a hyperination is a feasible outcome or
not.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the main empirical facts observed
in a variety of hyperinations. Section 3 contains the model. Section 4 characterizes an environment
in which the prospect of a reform is ex ante irrelevant for the equilibrium path. Section 5 discusses
conditions under which expectations-driven hyperinations are possible equilibrium outcomes under the
assumption that the government commits to implement the reform at a pre-announced future date, and
section 6 extends the analysis to the case of a state-contingent reform. Section 7 summarizes the main
results of the paper.
2 Empirical motivation: Stylized facts
As pointed out by Marcet and Nicolini (2003) many hyperinations, even if distant in time and/or
geographical location, display a number of common facts. Below, I briey describe the most recurrent
facts.
- Hyperinations usually occur in countries experiencing important scal imbalances, in the sense
that the resources that the government is able to collect from regular taxes and borrowing from nancial
markets are on average signicantly below the level of its expenditures, so that the resulting di¤erence is
funded by printing money. Fischer et al. (2002) report a strong positive relationship between seigniorage,
decits and ination using annual observations corresponding to a sample of 24 high-ination countries
over the period 1960-1995. A similar overall picture can be found in Catão and Terrones (2005). Also,
many country-specic studies also stress the role of seigniorage as a potential cause of hyperinationary
5
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bursts.9
- When ination reaches its highest values within the hyperinationary episode there is a lack of
strong contemporaneous correlation between seigniorage and ination. Indeed, seigniorage may well
decrease signicantly while ination still grows at increasing rates.10
- Stopping a hyperinationary process usually involves a mix of scal and monetary reforms whose aim
is to set limits to the ability of the government to monetize its decit by e.g. cutting public expenditure,
xing the exchange rate to a foreign currency with a good reputation in terms of ination, establishing
legally independent central banks with limitations to the amount of funds let to the government, im-
plementing rules to keep the growth of the money supply under limits (e.g. through currency boards),
etc.11 The process of ination-stabilization, from the peak of the ination series to the post-reform low
rate, takes a short period (a few months at most).
- The stock of real balances falls as ination increases over the course of a hyperination and remains
low but exhibiting an upward trend for a long period after the stabilization. In recent times, this
observation is closely related to the phenomenon of dollarization, i.e. the quasi-permanent substitution
of a foreign currency for the local one. For some recent empirical work on this question see e.g. Kamin
and Ericsson (2003) and Reinhart et al. (2003). This hysteresis-e¤ect is behind the well documented
observation that, just after the stabilization, (nominal) money supply increases at moderate-high rates
without causing noticeable inationary pressure.
Figure 1 contains some evidence on several hyperinationary episodes recorded in Germany, Ar-
gentina, Bolivia and Peru. These data generally conrm the standard facts above. In all cases, the
rise in ination goes parallel to the fall in real balances. The peaks in the ination rate coincide with
the lowest value of the stock of real money recorded for the entire period. At that point the stock of
real balances falls bellow the 40% of its value a couple of years before. Although average seigniorage is
clearly higher in the pre-reform period than after the collapse of the hyperinationary path for the four
countries, in some cases ination reaches its highest value while seigniorage is decreasing (as in Germany
10:1923 and Bolivia 12:1984-2:1985) while in others seigniorage remains high and increasing (as in Ar-
gentina) or fairly constant (as in Peru). In all cases, after the stabilization, the volume of seigniorage
was drastically cut down, ination remained low and stable, and the stock of real balances exhibited a
very slow recovery, thus conrming a strong hysteresis-e¤ect.
9See for instance (in italics the country under analysis) Sachs (1987; Bolivia ), Eckstein and Leiderman (1992; Israel ),
Kiguel and Neumeyer (1995; Argentina ), and Petrovic et al. (1999; Yusgoslavia ).
10The absence of a marked trend in seigniorage during hyperinationary periods has led many researchers to model
this variable as a constant (or with a constant mean, in stochastic environments). This is the strategy followed by e.g.
Bental and Eckstein (1990), Bruno and Fischer (1990), Kiguel (1989), Marcet and Nicolini (2003), Paal (2000), Sargent
and Wallace (1987), and Sargent et al. (2005). The model presented here uses this simplifying assumption too.
11See, e.g. Bruno et al. (1991) for a comprehensive review of several ination stabilization processes.
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3 The model
The model in this section is inspired in the cash-and-credit transactions economy studied by Ireland
(1995), who extends Lucas and Stokeys (1987) framework to allow for persistent e¤ects in the use
of credit. Households are assumed to exchange their consumption endowments by using government-
provided money or interpersonal credit. The latter requires the existence of a credit-link between the
intervening parts whose creation involves some initial xed and irreversible cost. However an existing
link can be used at not further cost at any subsequent date at which it remains operative. Transactions
made using money do not carry over any explicit cost beyond that associated with ination.
The main di¤erence with respect to Irelands model is intended to keep the subsequent dynamic
analysis as simple as possible.12 In particular, I assume that the volume of investment in the credit
technology in any period is bounded above, as the opportunities for investment arrive at a nite rate.
This artifact allows me to focus on monetary regimes along which the government is able to extract an
exogenously set amount of seigniorage over a non-trivial number of periods.
3.1 The households
Consider a discrete-time economy with N ( 3) types of goods and N types of households of population
size 1=N each. The household of type j produces good j and consumes good j + 1 (except the one with
type N; who consumes good 1). Each household consists of a continuum of members of unit mass. Half
of the members within a household are producers, who can obtain their goods up to a given capacity
y without cost. The other half are shoppers, without such a production capacity. All members in a
household share consumption equally.
In every period t; a fraction njt of household-js members, producers and shoppers, are linked to
the credit system, while the remaining fraction 1   njt are not. Each linked shopper has an established
bilateral relationship with a producer to buy his consumption good through a credit-link, cc;jt , subject
to the capacity constraint cc;jt  y: Symmetrically, each linked producer has a bilateral relationship with
a shopper to sell her product on credit, Cc;jt ; subject to the constraint C
c;j
t  y. All non-linked shoppers
(producers) go to a centralized market to buy (sell) goods with (in exchange for) cash as anonymous
members. Money received by non-linked producers can not be passed to shoppers within the same
household until the beginning of the following period.
The timing of events is as follows. At the beginning of every period t  1; households convene
in the centralized nancial market to settle outstanding debts and to accumulate governmentissued
money and bonds. Both government and private debts mature one period after issued and pay the same
nominal risk-free rate. Household-j enters this market with the cash obtained from selling a part of
12Previous formal applications of models with nancial innovation are either restricted to economies with exogenously
determined ination, as in Ireland (1995) and Uribe (1997), or to one-period or steady state analyses, as in Chang (1994)
and Sachs (1995), respectively. The approach taken here imposes the necessity of some simplifying assumptions as I am
dealing with explosive endogenous ination paths and sudden changes of regime.
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the common endowment at t  1; denoted by fM jt 1; with some maturing government bonds, inclusive of
interest, (1 + it 1)B
j
t 1; some invoices over other households, corresponding to the amount of goods sold
on credit during last period, (1 + it 1)Pt 1C
c;j
t 1 and, symmetrically, some debts corresponding to last
periods credit-nanced purchases, (1 + it 1)Pt 1c
c;j
t 1: The terms B
j
t 1; it 1 and Pt 1 are, respectively,
bond holdings, the nominal interest rate and the general price level.13 The government participates in
this market redeeming maturing bonds, collecting seigniorage (i.e. money injections by the central bank)
and taxes (assumed to be paid in cash), and issuing new bonds. The households constraint in this
market is
M jt +B
j
t + Pt t  fM jt 1 + (1 + it 1)Bjt 1 + Cc;jt 1   cc;jt 1 W jt (1)
where  t is the lump-sum tax and fM jt 1 is the households stock of monetary balances at the end of
the previous period and, hence, it satises fM jt  1  njtPty. Households are precluded from issuing
money, i.e.
M jt  0 (2)
Once households rearrange their nancial portfolios, non-linked producers engage in a process of nding
shoppers for their goods to establish a credit-link. A free producer nds an opportunity to establish a
credit link with a shopper with a probability  < 1: In such an event the producer may chose to invest in
the link by paying a utility cost of :14 In that case, the shopper commits to redeem the resulting debt
plus the interest rate in exchange for money in the nancial market during the following period. Clearly,
imposing  < 1 tantamounts to a limit on the speed of investment in the credit technology which, as
seen later in detail, translates into an upper bound to the speed of demonetization.15
Symmetrically, as in Ireland (1995), I assume that the households credit capacity is subject to a
form of depreciation. In particular, links have on average a nite life, as they are subject to a constant
probability of termination at the beginning of each period equal to 1   :16 This assumption is critical
for the arguments developed later. In practical terms, it implies that current individual decisions on
the mix of money and credit may have e¤ects beyond the current date and, hence, it works as a simple
device aimed at capturing the presence of hysteresis in the demand for real balances.
While there is uncertainty at the individual agent level (shopper and producer), the assumption of a
continuum of agents within each household implies that at the household level there is no uncertainty on
the total measure of the ows of new and existing links. Thus, the law of motion governing the measure
13 I am already assuming that all goods are traded at the same relative value. Given the symmetry imposed in endowments
and preferences this turns out to be true in the competitive equilibria analyzed later.
14A credit-link will generally create some monopolistic rents for the counterparts. As the interest here is in the evolution
of the aggregate stock of real balances and, in turn, ination, I consider a very simple (and extreme) rule governing the
sharing of the benets arising from a match: I assume that the producer pays the xed utility-cost and leaves the shopper
with an innitesimal share of the monopolistic pecuniary rents of the match. As participating in a this sort of credit
contract is costless for the shopper, he is happy to accept any strictly positive payment. For notational simplication, I
omit that negligible transfer in the forthcoming expressions.
15The assumptions of a constant probability of arrival of a credit-link opportunity and the symmetric proportion of
linked producers and shoppers are compatible with a random matching framework in which each individual, shopper or
producer, can only commit to maintain a single credit-link and the matching function exhibits constant returns to scale in
the number of non-linked agents on both sides of the market and a linear time-invariant total-e¢ ciency parameter :
16Similarly, Uribe (1997) assumes that the stock of social experience in transacting with dollars, rather than with the
local currency, depreciates at an exogenous constant rate.
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of credit-linked producers within household-j can be expressed as:
njt = 
h
1  njt 1
i
jt + n
j
t 1 (3)
where jt 2 [0; 1] captures the proportion of producers that take advantage of an opportunity to create a
credit-link. Notice that in writing (3), it is assumed that the set of non-linked producers who are eligible
to meet a free shopper includes those whose link has just vanished at the beginning of this period.
Then, the centralized market opens. In this market producers who do not deliver their stock of goods
on credit sell their production in exchange for money. Here, the following standard cash-in-advance
constraint applies,
cm;jt 
M jt
Pt
(4)
where cm;jt refers to the total measure of goods consumed by household-j that are purchased with cash.
Finally, the members of the household join to consume the shopperspurchases. In making its choices
at t; the household must respect the following ow of funds constraint
W jt+1 + it
fM jt
1 + it
+ Pt

cm;jt + c
c;j
t

 Pt (y    t) +W jt (5)
and a borrowing constraint that rules out games à la Ponzi
lim
T!1
W jT =
T 1Q
t=1
(1 + it)  0 (6)
All households enter period 1 with the same nancial wealth, in an amount exogenously given: W j1 =W1.
Also, the measure of credit-linked producers at the beginning of period 1 (just before the destruction of
some of these links) is given by history and identical across households: nj0 = n0:
Subject to the set of constraints in (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), and (6), household-j chooses a path forn
cm;js ; c
c;j
s ;M
j
s ;fM js ; Bjs ; njs; jso1
s=t
in order to maximize
Ut =
1X
s=t
s t
n
ln cjs   
h
1  njs 1
i
js
o
(7)
where cjs = c
m;j
s + c
c;j
s .
The necessary and su¢ cient conditions associated with the households optimization problem are (1),
(5), and (6) holding with equality and,
1. The intertemporal allocation of consumption satises the Euler equation
cjt+1
cjt
=  (1 + it)
Pt
Pt+1
(8)
2. When facing an opportunity, a producer decides to establish a credit-link and pay the xed
utility-cost if 	t > ; she is indi¤erent if 	t =  and forgoes the opportunity otherwise. The shadow-
value function 	t captures the discounted sum of the expected savings, in terms of the inationary tax,
9
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delivered by a credit-link and is given by
	t =
P1
s=1 
s 1txt+sQs 1
l=0 (1 + it+l)
Pt+l
Pt+l+1
(9)
where xt+1 is the ination rate between t and t+1; i.e.
Pt+1
Pt
 1; and t is an indicator function capturing
whether the producer is using that credit-link. It may take two values: 1 if the producers use the links
and 0 otherwise. Clearly, the producer sets t = 1 if xt+1 > 0; is indi¤erent between transacting using
the credit facility or attending the decentralized market if xt+1 = 0 and decides to trade his endowments
in exchange for cash if xt+1 < 0 (t = 0):
3. Since the nominal interest rate is positive in all the scenarios that I consider later, the household
optimally minimizes its end-of-period money holdings, i.e. M
j
t
Pt
= cm;jt and
fMjt
Pt
= (1  nt 1) y:
3.2 The government
The government in this economy collects taxes, issues and redeems bonds and provides the entire stock
of money. There is no government consumption. When choosing a combination of policy-instruments, it
is restricted by the two following constraints. First, a period-by-period ow of funds constraint,
Bt +Mt + Pt t = (1 + it 1)Bt 1 +Mt 1 (10)
where Mt and Bt represent the government supply of money and bonds at time t, respectively. Second,
an intertemporal constraint given by
(1 + it 1)Bt 1 =
1X
s=0
Pt+s t+s +Mt+s  Mt+s 1Qs
l=1 (1 + it+l)
(11)
where the initial stock of nominal government-issued assets, B0 and M0; is taken as given.
Regarding monetary policy, I consider two alternative policy regimes:
Fiscal-dominance regime. During this rst regime, operating from period 1 to T > 2 (including
both), the government sets an exogenous target for seigniorage. Money supply is then adjusted to satisfy
a seigniorage requirement, denoted by , according to the following rule
Mt = Pt+Mt 1 (1  t  T ) (12)
Monetary-dominance regime. This regime is implemented at T +1 (henceforth referred as the date of
reform). From that period on, the government targets a unique sequence of ination rates by adjusting
money supply accordingly. For notational simplicity and without loss of generality, I assume that the
targeted level of ination under this regime is constant and denote it by xL.
As the model admits multiplicity of equilibria when the government operates by choosing the amount
of money supplied in the nancial market in the latter regime, some of them hyperinationary, it is also
assumed that the government is willing to respond to upwards deviations from the ination target by
10
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backing the stock of money according to the following strategy. Taking PT and the aggregate equilibrium
stock of money at that date, MT ; as given, the government announces a sequence of money supplies
fMtg1t=T+1 : Such a sequence of money supplies will map into a unique sequence of equilibrium ination
rates if and only if the demand for real balances and, hence, the price level follow a unique path from
T + 1 on. Let us denote this sequence of prices as

PGt
	1
t=T+1
; whose exact elements are understood to
depend on fMtg1t=T+1 ; MT and PT ; and satisfy
PGT+1
PT
=
PGT+s+1
PGT +s
= 1+xL; for s = 1; :::;1: Then, in view
of an arbitrary price Pt > PGt at any t  T + 1; the government reacts by o¤ering the households the
possibility of redeeming each monetary unit in exchange for 1ePt bonds, where PGt  ePt < Pt: Obviously,
such a deal creates an arbitrage opportunity which is not compatible with individual optimization and,
hence, any Pt above the one consistent with the governments ination target can not be part of an
equilibrium.17
Notice that the credibility of this backing-scheme hinges on the households expectation about a
current and/or future scal adjustment consistent with the endogenous higher supply of government
bonds. Specically, credibility of this governments contingent strategy requires the commitment to
increase the discounted stream of taxes by an amount equal to MtePt :
As shown later, in most cases after the reform there will be a upward adjustment in the demand
for real balances. Thus, a constant targeted xL over this regime will require money injections, i.e.
Mt > Mt 1 for t  T + 1; which in turn implies that the government will earn some seigniorage whose
amount is (endogenously) driven by the path followed by the stock of real balances. Therefore, in this
regime the supply of bonds and the sequence of taxes must be adjusted to satisfy (10) and (11).
3.3 Equilibrium
In the remaining of the paper, I restrict attention to symmetric competitive equilibria dened as
Denition 1 A perfect-foresight symmetric competitive equilibrium in this economy is a collection of
sequences
n
cms ; c
c
s;Ms;
fMs; Bs; ns; s; s; Ps; iso1
s=t
and a government policy such that the following con-
ditions are satised:
1. Households maximize their utility subject to the initial conditions, W1 and n0; and the constraints
(1)-(6), taking as given the price and interest rate sequences and the government policy.
2. The government satises its budget constraints (10) and (11).
3. All markets clear at each date.
(where I have dropped for simplicity the households superscript j). Note that this denition is
su¢ ciently broad so as to apply to the two scal-monetary regimes described in section 3.2.
17This backing scheme resembles the one considered by Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1983) and Nicolini (1996).
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4 Fiscal-monetary reform (in)e¤ectiveness
In what follows I check the ability of the model developed before to (qualitatively) account for the
empirical facts listed earlier and to provide an answer to the following questions:
First. When is a credible scal-monetary reform e¤ective to prevent a hyperination?
Second. What are the factors that may explain the occurrence of a hyperination as a self-fullled
prophecy?
I order to make the above queries explicit within the model, it is convenient to give a meaning to the
terms hyperinationand self-fullled hyperinationusing the own language of the model. For this
purpose, an important part of the following discussion is referred to two possible (extreme) equilibrium
paths: the high ination path and the low ination path (HIP and LIP, henceforth). Using these two
almost self-explanatory inationary paths (whose formal denition is given below), I will henceforth use
the term hyperinationas the occurrence of the HIP and self-fullledor speculativehyperination
as the occurrence of the HIP whenever the LIP is simultaneously a possible equilibrium outcome. On
the one hand, this particular convention sacrices some generality. First, because for a class of reforms
(non-contingent or xed-date reforms) it might be di¢ cult to empirically distinguish the HIP from other
possible equilibria that yield ination paths almost as high as the HIP. Second, because other paths may
coexist as potential equilibria with the LIP and/or the HIP, so that could equally be labelled as self-
fullled prophecies. On the other hand, by focusing on the conditions under which the HIP may occur we
will draw an important and interesting conceptual line, namely that one separating an ex ante e¤ective
scal-monetary reform (to be claried later) from an ine¤ective one. Nonetheless, the formal discussion
that follows also devotes some attention to other non-extreme inationary paths, in part because it is
shown that under some conditions, non-extreme paths are the only possible equilibrium outcome.
In the remaining of this section, I rst describe some conditions on the ination rate targeted after
the reform and the volume of seigniorage collected over the scal-dominance regime that are needed to
characterize a meaningful hyperinationary scenario and then provide an answer to the rst question
above: when is a reform e¤ective to prevent a hyperination? I carry out this task here under the
assumption that the government credibly commits to reform its scal-monetary plan at some future date
T+1; regardless of the state of the economy at that date.18 In section 5 I focus on the case of self-fullled
hyperinations and in section 6 I consider an alternative (state-contingent) rule for abandoning the scal-
dominance regime showing that the key properties of the analysis conducted under the benchmark case
of a xed-date reform continue to hold under this alternative specication of government policy.
18The assumption that the public knows with certainty the date of the reform is followed by Bental and Eckstein (1990)
and Paal (2000).
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4.1 Parameter assumptions
Let us consider the two extreme cases in which the households either exploit the possibility to establish
a credit-link whenever possible (thus setting t = 1) or refuse to invest in the credit technology at all
(t = 0) over the scal-dominance regime: Assuming the former case, the economy-wide measure of
producers with a credit-link at t; according to (3), is given by
nt =  + (1  ) nt 1 (13)
Thus, denoting by mt the proportion of producers that sell their goods in exchange for money, i.e.
mt = 1  nt; we can write
mt = (1  ) [1   (1 mt 1)]   I (mt 1) (14)
After applying the normalization y = 1; from the equilibrium condition Mt = fMt; it follows that mt
above represents the end-of-period stock of real balances in the economy, which may take values in the
unit interval as long as it > 0:
Equation (14) captures the law of motion of m conditional on every producer investing in the credit
technology at the highest pace. Conversely, when no new credit-links are made, it can be readily veried
that the degree of monetization evolves according to
mt = 1   (1 mt 1)   N (mt 1) (15)
Next, I introduce the following general assumptions which will be maintained throughout unless otherwise
noted.
Assumption 1 (Ex post e¤ective reform). The ination rate targeted in the post-reform
monetary-dominance regime, xL; is bounded above by
xL  xT+s < min
(
xT ;
P1
s=1 
ss 1
)
; s  1 (16)
The bounds above imply, rst, that the change of regime always leads to a fall in ination at the
time of the reform, regardless of the history up to that date (i.e. xL < xT ) and, second, that the reform
is always successful in stopping an eventual ight from money from the time of its implementation
on (i.e. xL < 
P1
s=1 
ss 1
	 1
).19 Thus, in equilibrium s = 0; s  T . Both features are clearly
consistent with the evidence described before.
Assumption 2 (Feasibility of the seigniorage target) The level of seigniorage collected over
the scal-dominance regime, ; is bounded above by
 < max  (1  ) (1  ) 1  
T 1
1   + 
T 1m0 (17)
19 In writing the term in the right side of this inquality, we note that the real return on debts, r, is constant over time,
1 + r  (1 + it) PtPt+1 = 
 1; a result that follows from the goods-market clearing condition and the Euler equation (8).
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where    (1  ) : When this inequality holds, the amount of seigniorage targeted by the government
before the implementation of the reform is feasible even when every household invests in the credit
technology in every period t = 1; :::; T   1; so that mT 1 takes its minimum possible value (given by the
right hand side of (17)). Implicit in this argument is the fact that households do not invest in the credit
technology at T: This is consistent with the class of reforms considered in assumption 1.
Assumption 3 (Dynamic negative association between real balances and ination). For
 > 0; the targeted level of seigniorage satises
 > 1   (18)
This condition implies that, regardless of the evolution of the degree of monetization over the scal-
dominance regime, i.e. both if mt follows (14) or (15), the resulting equilibrium ination rate, xt; can
be expressed as decreasing function of the last-period degree of monetization, mt 1: To see this, let us
write (12) as
xt =
mt 1
mt      1; 2  t  T (19)
Then, substituting mt for its two extreme values given in (14),  I (mt 1), and (15),  N (mt 1) ; and
taking a simple derivative in (19), we can write
@xt
@mt 1

mt= I(mt 1)
< 0,  > (1  ) (1  )
@xt
@mt 1

mt= N (mt 1)
< 0,  > 1  
Thus, as  < 1; the inequality in (18) is a su¢ cient condition for the ination rate to be negatively
related to mt 1; regardless of the law of motion of mt: The following result is a direct consequence of the
ination-generation process (19) and the specication of the  -functions, (14) and (15). Given  > 0; if
assumption 3 holds then the following inequalities are satised
xIt > x
N
t for 2  t  T (20)
xIt+1  xIt and xNt+1  xNt for 2  t  T   1 (21)
where xIt is the ination rate satisfying (19), conditional on ms satisfying ms =  
I (ns 1) ; for s = 2; :::; t:
Analogously, xNt is dened as the ination rate at t conditional on no credit-link being established at
any date from 1 up to t; both inclusive, i.e. ms =  N (ms 1) ; for s = 2; :::; t: Thus, it follows that,
for a su¢ ciently high level of seigniorage, the ination rate associated with a sequence of degrees of
monetization satisfying ms =  I (ms 1) is always higher than the corresponding to a sequence obeying
ms =  
N (ms 1) : Also from the above inequalities, we learn that for a su¢ ciently high level of seigniorage
a decreasing m-sequence is associated with an increasing sequence of ination rates and vice versa, i.e.
increasing m over time leads to lower ination rates.
The basic content of the above result is a very simple one: by restricting the volume of seigniorage
to satisfy (18), we focus on scal-dominance regimes along which a higher degree of monetization is
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associated with a lower ination rate. This idea resembles the one underlying the analyses based on the
interpretation of seigniorage as a tax paid by money holders, along the increasing arm of an ination-tax
La¤er curve, in the sense that a higher tax base (real balances or degree of monetization) needs a lower
tax rate (ination) to yield the same total revenue (seigniorage). As (18) imposes a lower bound on
seigniorage or, alternatively, a lower bound on the degree of persistence of the credit technology, ; it is
not at odds with the common view of high levels of seigniorage being, at least in part, responsible for
hyperinationary processes and with the empirical evidence presented in section 2 regarding the slow
recovery of the degree of monetization observed after a hyperination.
4.2 The case of an ex ante ine¤ective reform
Next I dene the two extreme paths (HIP and LIP) using the laws of motion for the degree of monetization
under the assumption that t takes one of the extreme values, 1 or 0, obtained before in (14) and (15),
respectively.
Denition 2 The high ination path (HIP) is the sequence

xIt
	T
t=2
that satises (19) given that the
sequence fmtgT 1t=2 satises mt =  I (mt 1) : The low ination path (LIP) is the sequence

xNt
	T
t=2
that
satises (19) given that the sequence fmtgT 1t=2 satises mt =  N (mt 1) :
Using the shadow-value function (9) together with the equilibrium conditions 1+it1+xt+1 = 
 1 and
ct = 1; we can dene the time-t (unique) shadow-value function associated with the HIP as
	It =
T tX
s=1
ss 1xIt+s +
T t+1T t
1   
L
t x
L (22)
where Lt 2 f0; 1g denotes whether pre-existing credit-links are used after the reform. According to
denition 2, xIt is given by
xIt =
(1  ) (1  ) 1 t 11  + t 1m0
(1  ) (1  ) 1 t1  + tm0   
(23)
where m0  1   n0: Thus, equation (22) captures the (gross) prot given by a credit link when all
households exploit every opportunity for investment in the credit technology in each period within the
pre-reform period: As the households follow this pattern, the resulting equilibrium sequence of ination
rates is the highest possible one. Then, denoting inf

	It
	T 1
t=1
by 	I ; and according to (9), the following
condition is necessary and su¢ cient for the feasibility of the HIP as an equilibrium path
	I   (24)
By simple inspection of (22) and (23) the qualitative e¤ect of most parameters and policy variables
on condition (24) becomes evident. Higher values of  increase the total return of the investment in
a credit-link, thus raising 	It ; and, hence, 	
I ; thus tending to make the HIP a feasible outcome. A
similar e¤ect comes from ; as higher  means a longer average life for a link. Also, from (23), higher
 contributes to a more rapid demonetization and, thus, to a higher sequence of future ination rates
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and a higher value for the credit-technology at any t: This latter e¤ect is also caused by a lower initial
condition, m0. From (22) and (24), it is also clear that a lower value for the cost of establishing a credit
link, ; tends to favor the occurrence of the HIP.
Regarding the policy instruments, ; T and xL; their inuence on condition (24) is also very intuitive.
High seigniorage goes in hand with high ination rates, given a path for m; thus pushing 	I up: A
restrictive monetary supply over the post-reform period contributes, given every thing else, to keep
ination low also in the pre-reform period, since low values for xL reduce the expected return gained
from each credit-link. Also, an early reform (low T ) reduces the incentives to invest in the credit
technology, since it shortens the period over which that investment yields high ination-savings (the pre-
reform period). Finally, the e¤ect of time on 	It is likely to be non-monotonic due to a discount-e¤ect.
Indeed, all the numerical simulations discussed later yield a hump-shaped 	It function, i.e. the lowest
values are located at the beginning and at the end of the pre-reform period.
In sum, an equilibrium along which the prospect of an orthodox scal-monetary reform does not
have any positive e¤ect on the demand for real balances and, hence, on the ination rate except just at
the moment of its implementation can not always be ruled out. It is worth noticing the di¤erent nature
of the reform-ine¤ectiveness result in this environment and in those studied in some earlier works. In
Bental and Eckstein (1990) and Paal (2000) the prospect of a reform is the underlying determinant of
an increasing ination path and, hence, in both cases, the absence of such a reform would preclude such
an outcome. In contrast, in the economy studied here, the prospect of a reform may or not preclude the
occurrence of a hyperination, but its sole expectation never causes it.
Also, the fact that the reform considered here may exert an ex ante anti-inationary e¤ect, reversing
the inequality in (24), distinguishes this economy from the ones studied by Kiguel (1989) and Marcet
and Nicolini (2003), since in both cases the possibility of a reform is never acknowledged by the public.
However, in this economy, when the reform takes place and how it is implemented, i.e. T and xL,
respectively, matters.
5 Speculative hyperinations
5.1 Coexistence conditions
In this section I extend the analysis to the case of speculative or self-fullled hyperinations. As com-
mented before, for the sake of the clarity, I concentrate the discussion on the conditions under which the
coexistence of the two extreme inationary paths in denition 2 is possible. For the moment, I retain
the exogenous reform-date assumption. Let us dene the time-t shadow-value function associated with
the LIP as
	Nt =
T tX
s=1
ss 1xNt+s +
T t+1T t
1   
L
t x
L (25)
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where xNt is given by
xNt =
1  t 1 (1 m0)
1  t (1 m0)  
(26)
The function 	Nt captures the benets for a single household from investing in a credit-link conditional
on that link being the only one made from that period on, i.e. it captures the individual incentives to
invest in the credit technology when it is understood that nobody else will ever invest. As assumptions 1
and 3 hold, we learn that 	Nt is a decreasing function of time and satises 	
N
t < 	
I
t for t = 1; :::; T   1.
Hence, the following sign condition is necessary and su¢ cient for the feasibility of the LIP
	N1   (27)
Clearly, the inuence of the parameters and policy variables on condition (27) is the opposite one with
respect to (24), that is, low values of ; ; ; xL and T; and high values of m0 and  run in favor of the
feasibility of the LIP.
Then, combining (24) and (27), we learn that an extreme speculative hyperination is possible in this
environment if the following condition holds
	N1    	I (28)
Next, I analyze the role of some of the parameters of the model regarding the fulllment of condition
(28), restricting most of the analysis to ;  and : Devoting special attention to  and  is obliged here,
since these parameters are the critical ingredients in this economy. Also, by focusing on seigniorage, we
get a net picture of the main di¤erences between this model and some previous approaches based on
relating the observed ination rate to the amount of seigniorage through an ination-tax La¤er curve.
5.1.1 A dynamic La¤er-curve
In order to investigate how seigniorage over the scal-dominance regime relates to the possibility of mul-
tiple equilibria, I characterize the threshold conditions (24) and (27) as functions of ; taking everything
else as given. The following proposition describes the necessary conditions for the existence of a non
empty set of s for which the HIP and LIP coexist and establishes the boundaries of that set.
Proposition 1 Let us dene the following two limit values for ;
  lim
%max
	IT 1
  lim
&1 
	N1
If     ; then there exist a unique I such that 	It
 
I

=  and a unique N such that 	N1
 
N

= ;
and there are multiple equilibria if I < N and  2 I ; N :
Proof. The necessity of a bounded  is simple. The upper bound  is dened as the cost of a credit
link such that the HIP is feasible when  is set arbitrarily close to its maximum sustainable level, max; as
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given in (17). In computing ; notice that lim
%max
xIT 1 !1; so for nite T and ; lim
%max
	It !1 > 
for 1  t  T   2; and, hence, feasibility of the HIP hinges exclusively on the value of lim
%max
	IT 1:
Likewise, the lower bound  implies that  is always su¢ ciently high so that individuals optimally give
up their opportunities to expand their portfolio of credit-links whenever  is set close to its minimum
possible value, 1  ; consistently with assumption 3:
Hence the existence of I and N amounts to impose a rather mild condition, namely, that we can
nd a su¢ ciently high (low) ; within the limits imposed in assumptions 1 and 2, such that the HIP
(LIP) is a possible equilibrium outcome.
Uniqueness of the threshold values I and N and the necessity of an intermediate  2 I ; N ;
both follow from the fact that 	It and 	
N
1 are (strictly) monotonically increasing functions of .
Figure 2 depicts xT (i.e. the last endogenously determined ination rate) as a function of ; under
the assumption that I < N , for the two extreme paths, HIP and LIP. This gure shares an important
feature with a standard hump-shaped ination-tax La¤er-curve, namely that some levels of seigniorage
can be nanced at either a stable and low (or moderate) ination rate or at an unstable rising one.
However, in this economy a speculative hyperination will not take place for low values of seigniorage ( <
I) since the prospect of a future reform renders the investment in the credit technology no protable
enough. Another important feature of this economy is that along a speculative hyperinationary path
ination is always positively associated with the level of seigniorage, just the opposite result found in the
analyses performed by Sargent and Wallace (1987) and Bruno and Fischer (1990), since, in those models,
the fact that a speculative hyperination is understood as the economy slipping into the decreasing arm
of the La¤er-curve implies that one should expect higher rates of ination when seigniorage is low.
Figure 2 also makes clear that the model is compatible with the main result obtained in the money-
market partial-adjustment framework employed by Kiguel (1989) and Romer (2001), namely that too
high seigniorage, i.e. in this model values of  > N ; will invariably result in a hyperinationary
path. However, while admitting the potential importance of seigniorage in causing a hyperination,
this model still allows for equilibrium hyperinationary paths even when the quantitative measure of
scal-dominance before the reform is thought to be only moderate, i.e. values of  falling within the
interval

I ; N

:
5.1.2 Persistency of the credit technology
The possibility of persistent e¤ects of the credit technology beyond the time of the reform is critical for
the co-existence of the two extreme equilibria. There are two scenarios in this economy in which the
use of credit over the scal-dominance-regime is not maintained after the reform: (i) if the government
chooses a post-reform ination target, xL; below zero, i.e. the cost of using an existing link, and (ii) if
a credit link is only operative one period, i.e.  = 0: Below I deal with the latter case and postpone to
the next section the case of xL < 0:
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Proposition 2 If  = 0; then there exists a unique equilibrium.
Proof. Let us assume that the credit technology only lasts for one period, i.e. each credit-link is
only e¤ective in the period of its creation. Then (9), in equilibrium, simplies to
	t = txt+1 (29)
where t now simply indicates whether the credit-link is established (t = 1) or not (t = 0). Since
the reform, by assumption (see (16)), precludes the creation of new links, i.e. xL <  ; we learn that in
equilibrium T = 0 and, according to (15), mT = 1 for any value of mT 1: Let us consider the following
two values of mT 1; each associated with an extreme T 1: 0 and 1; and the corresponding (according
to (19)) ination rates at T :
mT 1 =

mIT 1 = 1  
mNT 1 = 1
xT =

xIT =
1 
1    1
xNT =
1
1    1
(30)
Thus, as  < 1; we learn that xIT < x
N
T ; i.e. just before the implementation of the reform, there is a
negative relationship between the last periods degree of monetization, mT 1; and the current periods
ination rate, xT :20 Next, let us consider three alternative cases, depending on the sign of the following
di¤erences: xIT   b and xNT   b; where b   :
Case 1. xNT  b  0: As xIT < xNT ; it follows that xIT b < 0. Then, the optimal householdsdecision at
T  1 is not to invest in the credit technology, i.e. there is no T 1 2 (0; 1] such that 1 T 11   1 b > 0:
Thus, in equilibrium, mT 1 = mT = 1: The same argument clearly applies to any period t 2 [1; T   1] ;
so, from (19), we learn that the equilibrium ination rate is also uniquely determined (and constant)
over the pre-reform regime, i.e.
x
(1)
t =
1
1     1 for 2  t  T:
Case 2. xIT  b  0: In this case xNT  b > 0 must hold and the households optimally decide to exhaust
their opportunities to invest in the credit technology at T  1; so that T 1 = 1 and mT 1 = 1 : Then,
the lowest possible ination at T  1 is 1 1   1 > xIT > b; i.e. the rate that would prevail in a situation
in which the households set T 2 = 1: Thus, the households optimally set T 2 = 1, and, applying this
argument backwards, we nd that in any equilibrium t = 1 and mt = 1   for t = 1; :::; T   1: Then,
given a unique equilibrium sequence fmtgT 1t=1 , it follows that there is also a unique equilibrium sequence
of ination rates satisfying
x
(2)
t =
(
1 
1     1; 2  t  T   1
1 
1    1 t = T
(31)
Case 3. xNT  b > 0 and xIT  b < 0: This case is clearly incompatible with the limiting values of T 1;
0 and 1. First, T 1 = 0 can not be optimal since the ination rate resulting from the highest level of
20Notice that this result is directly driven by the assumption  = 0; which is itself inconsistent with assumption 2. To
see this, notice that the sign condition in (18) cannot be satised as  = 0 and, thus, the chains of implications following
that condition do not longer hold.
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monetization, mNT 1 = 1; is higher than the unit cost of a credit-link. Symmetrically, T 1 = 1 can not
be optimal either, for the ination rate consistent with mIT 1 = 1  falls below the cost of a link. Thus,
in a symmetric equilibrium, the household chooses an intermediate T 1 2 (0; 1), i.e. some producers
within the household invest and some others, while having the opportunity, do not: But this implies
that at the margin the household must be indi¤erent between establishing a link or not. Therefore, the
(unique) equilibrium ination rate at T satises xT = b and xT 2  xIT ; xNT  : Then, we can use (19) to
solve for the unique equilibrium T 1 :
b = 1  T 1
1     1
Given a unique mT 1 = 1   T 1; we learn that xNT 1  11 T 1    1 > xNT > b; so that the
relevant condition governing the households choice for T 2 is given by the sign of xIT 1   b; where
xIT 1  1 1 T 1    1: If xIT 1   b < 0; following the same argument above, the equilibrium ination
rate at T   1 is equal to b and (19) can be solved for the unique equilibrium T 2: This iterative process
continues up to a period t at which the following inequality holds,
xIt+1 
1  
1  t+1      1 
b (32)
with t+1 < 1; in which case, we learn that individual optimality calls for t = t 1 = ::: = 1 = 1:
Combining (32) for two consecutive dates, s  1 and s; we can write the following dynamic equation
s 1 =
1  b (1  )

+ bs
which, for a terminal condition T 1 given in (32), can be solved for a unique equilibrium sequence
fsgt
+1
s=T 1 : Further, since b; ; and s all fall below 1; the elements in this sequence satisfy s 1 > s
and, hence, ms 1 < ms: The degree of monetization for all t = 1; ::; t is constant and equal to 1 1   :
Then, given a unique equilibrium sequence fmtgTt=1 ; we can solve for the unique equilibrium sequence
of ination rates fxtgTt=2 ;
x
(3)
t =
8><>:
1 
1     1; 2  t  t
1 
1 t+1    1 t = t + 1b t = t + 2; :::; T
Using the terminology introduced above, Case 1 corresponds to the LIP and Case 2 to the HIP. We can
then solve for the two critical -thresholds, such that both extreme cases are feasible, to nd the following
step-function relating seigniorage to the equilibrium ination sequence over the pre-reform period
x
t
2tT
=
8>><>>:
x
(1)
t for 
(1)  N  b
1+b
x
(2)
t for 
(2)  I  +b
1+b
x
(3)
t for 
(3) 2  L; H (33)
The three possible equilibrium ination sequences, x(1)t ; x
(2)
t and x
(3)
t are plotted in gure 3.
This proposition is intuitive. As  = 0; the reform considered here leads to a unique optimal means-
of-transaction portfolio decision over the monetary-dominance regime, which tantamounts to say that
the householdsoptimal actions from T on are completely independent of their actions at any earlier date.
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In plain words, the future is independent of past. Then, the ability of the government to implement a
monetary rule consistent with an exogenously xed level of seigniorage implies, in view of (19), that for
the unique possible futurethere is a unique possible past.
By imposing  = 0; we get a version of the model that replicates one of the salient features of the
Cagan-type demand for real balances function, namely, that the only relevant endogenous variable for
the individuals decision of how much money to hold is the next period expected ination, as made clear
by (29). Hence, in this critical aspect the no-hysteresis version of our economy falls within the general
class examined Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1983) and Nicolini (1996) and not surprisingly for a given path of
government policy choices there is only space for one set of equilibrium beliefs.
On the other hand, when  > 0; the previous conclusion does not necessarily hold and there is a
chance for the coexistence condition (28) to hold. A successful post-reform policy aimed at stabilizing
the rate of ination at a low level induces a unique optimal private behavior from the time of the reform
on but it may not be su¢ cient to induce a unique optimal behavior before its implementation and, hence,
private expectations may play a role in selecting a particular equilibrium.
5.1.3 The speed of demonetization
In some models of hyperinations the existence of an upper bound in the velocity of demonetization (i.e.
the fall in m between two consecutive periods) is a necessary condition to generate a hyperinationary
path when seigniorage is high, such that violations of that threshold lead to a reversal of the dynamics of
the model. For example, in the Kiguel-Romer framework with partial adjustment in the money market,
a su¢ ciently high speed of adjustment may invert the sign of the correlation between seigniorage and
ination, yielding disinationary paths when seigniorage is above the maximum level dictated by the
stationary ination-tax La¤er-curve. A similar e¤ect is also found in some models with backward looking
expectations (crude adaptive or quasi-rational expectations as in the modern literature on learning
mechanisms).21 To put it in simple terms, such a feature implies that should individuals be able to
y from moneyat a su¢ ciently fast rate, say because there are not important obstacles to access to
alternative means of payment (i.e. high ), we would observe very severe hyperinations when seigniorage
is low and pronounced disinations with high volumes of seigniorage.
Such a counterintuitive feature is also shared by the version of the model analyzed before when  = 0:
The following example illustrates this point. Let us assume an initial situation with a level of seigniorage
satisfying  > 
0+b
1+b : According to (33), individual optimality implies that equilibrium ination in the
pre-reform regime is given by (31), with  = 0: Now, let us suppose that  rises up to 0 > 0, such that,
for the same ; now  < 
0+b
1+b : This upward adjustment in  moves the economy into the intermediate
21For a discussion of this point in the context of a mechanism of crude adaptive expectations see, e.g. Bruno and Fischer
(1990). Lettau and van Zandt (2003) and Adam, Evans and Honkapojha (2005) investigate how the usage of current
versus past ination rates in forming expectations a¤ect the dynamic properties of a standard model of seigniorage under
alternative learning rules, showing that under some widely used specications for the learning rule, the use of updated,
rather than lagged, information tends to make an explosive hyperination a more unlikely result.
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region in (33), thus lowering the ination rate at T (since 1 
0
1    1 > b) and at every date su¢ ciently
close to the reform, at which x = b for  = 0. Further, for su¢ ciently high  (or low T ) the equilibrium
ination sequence is uniformly lower under 0 than under 0; that is, a more e¤ective mechanism for
bringing together unlinked shoppers and producers (i.e. higher ) results in a lower degree of usage of
credit and, thus, at some dates, in lower ination.
The previous outcome vanishes as soon as the parameters allow for the possibility of hysteresis after
the reform, as formally stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 If  > 0 and xL > 0; then higher  implies (i) a uniformly higher ination rate along
the HIP, and (ii) a wider range of coexistence of extreme equilibria.
Proof. (i) Straightforward. From the denition of xIt (see (23)), we learn that
dxIt
d > 0:
(ii) By totally di¤erentiating (22) and using the denition of I in proposition 1, we obtain that d
I
d <
0: Similarly, using (25) and (26), we learn that d
N
d = 0: Hence, it trivially follows that
d(N I)
d > 0:
Thus, when the private sector can easily substitute credit for money as an alternative means of
carrying out transactions and individuals internalize the persistence of their decisions, a simple and
intuitive proposition applies: extreme speculative hyperinations are more likely outcomes.22
Finally, when the velocity of demonetization or its degree of persistence are su¢ ciently low, given
everything else, the necessary condition for the existence of an extreme speculative hyperination, I 
N ; is violated, so that there is never an overlap between the HIP and LIP, even if (18) holds. When this is
the case, it can be shown that for intermediate levels of seigniorage  2  N ; I there is always, at least,
one equilibrium in which every household exhausts its opportunities to invest in the credit technology up
to some period t; for 2  t  T   2 and stop investing from t+ 1 on, so that the equilibrium path for m
exhibits a [-shape over time. Further, over this range of s, this class of m-paths are the only admissible
ones, thus implying that the reform only exerts a positive e¤ect on the demand for real balances when
the date of the reform is perceived as su¢ ciently close.23 A complete proof is provided in the Appendix.
5.2 Some numerical illustrations
Figures N1 to N7 contain the results of some numerical simulations of the model. In all cases considered
here, the minimum value of the shadow-value function 	It over the period running from t = 1 to T   1
was found at T   1; this reecting, among other things, that the prospect of a reform supporting a low
ination rate (xL was set in most numerical exercises at 0.1) tends to reduce the incentives for investing in
22 In his classic study on inationary nance, Nichols (1974) formulates an intuitive principle to avoid hyperinations, or
at least to keep ination under some control, in face of a given target for seigniorage: restrict the publics access to those
assets that may be seen as close substitutes for money. Chang (1994) also points out that policies tending to decrease the
usage of foreign currency should reduce ination. Proposition 3 shows that those reections are plainly compatible with
this model.
23 In general, this class of paths may also exist when I < N .
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the credit technology specially in the period preceding its implementation. Figures N1 and N2 depict the
size of the overlap between the two extreme ination paths (i.e. the the di¤erence N  I) as a function
of the degree of persistence, ; and the speed of demonetization, ; respectively, for several pre-reform
time-horizons. For both parameters, the size of the -set such that extreme speculative hyperinations
are possible is positively related to the value of the relevant parameter regardless of the length of the
pre-reform period. For low values of these parameters the overlap disappears (i.e. N I takes negative
values).
Figure N3 is the numerical counterpart of the time T La¤er curve in gure 2. The parameters are
chosen so that the overlap N  I is positive, thus both the LIP and the HIP may coexist. In addition
to these two extreme paths, this gure plots the time T ination rates arising under non-monotonic
paths along which the equilibrium level of monetization, m, decreases up to some period i  1 and then
grows up uniformly from i on. The discontinuous e¤ect of seigniorage on the time T ination rate (and,
hence, on the entire ination-sequence) and the scope for multiple, and quantitatively very di¤erent,
equilibrium paths become apparent.
Figure N4, on the other hand, depicts a situation in which , while positive, is so low that N < I :
The emerging picture is then very di¤erent: the e¤ect of seigniorage on the optimal portfolio decision
and the resulting ination sequence exhibits a high degree of smoothness, very much as the suggested
by the conventional arguments based on the upward sloped arm in a static ination-tax La¤er curve, in
the sense that high volumes of seigniorage tend to uniformly cause high ination.
Figures N5 to N7 represent the two extreme shadow-value functions together with those associated
with [-shapedm-paths,24 the time-invariant cost function (left column) and the corresponding sequences
of the ination rate and the degree of monetization (right column) for T = 10. As in every case considered
here assumption 2 holds, the shadow value function is uniformly higher as individuals postpone the time
for stopping their investments in credit-links. In the three cases depicted in gures N5 to N7, xL is equal
to 0.1, i.e. hysteresis in m after the reform is possible, and N > I ; so that there is an overlap between
the LIP and the HIP. The case depicted in the rst row (gures N5A and N5B) corresponds to a level
of seigniorage su¢ ciently low so that the only feasible equilibrium corresponds to the LIP. Hence, for
a given initial condition for m0 below 1, m grows and x decreases over the pre-reform period. Figures
N6A and N6B represent a situation with an intermediate level of seigniorage falling within the interval 
I ; N

: Thus, both the LIP and the HIP are possible equilibrium outcomes. Also, a path along which
the households coordinate their actions to invest in credit-links up to t = 8 and to stop investing from
t = 9 on is possible (at the same time, no other [-shaped m-path can be an equilibrium). In the case
depicted in Figures N7A and N7B, seigniorage is above I and it is high enough so as to preclude any
path di¤erent from the HIP: the prospect of a reform does not help to prevent an all-the-way ight from
money. It is worth noticing that the required increase in  to move the economy from the situation in
24The function e	t is also depicted (see the Appendix for its denition) to facilitate the graphic inspection of the fulllment
of the necessary conditions for the occurence of [-shaped m-paths.
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gure 6 to the one in gure 7 may be only a marginal one. The consequences, however, can be dramatic
in terms of the potential di¤erences in the observed ination paths.
Also notice that the ination rate in the HIP just before the reform, xT , is in all cases below the one
observed in the preceding period, so that the ination rate sequence is not a monotonic function of time
along that path. This attenuating e¤ect is driven by the positive (negative) e¤ect of the reform on mT
(xT ). However this feature of the model can not be understood as being incompatible with the empirical
evidence, as a short period of downward adjustment in the ination rate following its peak and just
before the implementation of the reformed were observed in some of the most explosive hyperinations,
as those experienced by Argentina and Germany (see gure 1).
6 State-contingent reforms
Although the discussion up to here has referred to the case in which the government commits to implement
a scal-monetary reform at some time T regardless of the history of the economy up to that date, most
of the previous key results regarding the (in)e¤ectiveness of an anticipated reform can be easily extended
to account for the possibility that the government will only react if things get su¢ ciently bad, i.e. if the
ination rate threatens to go beyond some limits. The case of a state-contingent reform is interesting
in its own as in fact this is the assumption followed by Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1983), Nicolini (1996) and
Marcet and Nicolini (2003). All these papers consider a simple rule followed by the government for
deciding whether to reform or not: to implement a real-backing mechanism at some date t if, absent the
threat of such a reform, the ination rate would violate some nite threshold value, x (reaction point):25
As the interest here is to analyze the e¤ects of such a commitment on the occurrence of purely
expectations-driven hyperinations, the natural context to frame this question is one in which, for a
given scal-monetary pre-reform regime, there is a non-hyperinationary path (a no-crisis equilibrium).
This general picture may be embedded in the present model imposing the following conditions
Reform at t if xNRt  x and

xNRt
	t 1
s=2
< x
Do not reform at t if

xNRt
	t
s=2
< x
1X
s=1
sps 1
1  s (1 m0)
1  s+1 (1 m0)  
  (34)
x <

1  (1  ) (1  )
1   
 1
(35)
The rst lines describe the rule followed by the government to switch from a regime of targeted seigniorage
to one of targeted (low) ination. The government abandons the former regime at the rst period at
which the ination rate within that regime, xNRt ; would be equal or above some limit x; exogenously
chosen. It also assumed that (16) still holds, so the reform is always ex post e¤ective.
25Yet, they di¤er in the particular real-backing mechanism at work. While Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1983) assume that the
government reacts by o¤ering the possibility of redeeming money giving some productive capital in exchange, in Nicolini
(1996) and Marcet and Nicolini (2003) it is assumed that the government operates a xed-exchange rate to end the crisis.
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The inequality in (34) imposes an implicit upper bound to the volume of seigniorage targeted in the
rst regime, such that there is, at least, one no-crisis equilibrium (the LIP) that is consistent with the
seigniorage target, ; being implemented forever, i.e. a scenario in which the threat of the reform is
never executed.
The left side of that inequality corresponds to 	N1 in (25) when this function is dened over an innite
horizon. Notice that, provided (18) holds, this is the relevant measure of the long-run sustainability of
the LIP as a potential equilibrium since xNt and 	
N
t are both decaying over time. The right side in the
inequality in (35) is the (limiting) constant ination rate attained when the degree of monetization is at
its minimum possible value, i.e. the stationary state with zero net ow of new credit links. Thus, that
inequality rules out the possibility that the threshold value x is set at a su¢ ciently high level so as to
always preclude the implementation of the reform. Notice that this last sign condition is only relevant if
 is low enough to be maintained in the stationary state in which m reaches its minimum possible value,
i.e. (1 )(1 )1  : But nothing forces the government to choose a  that is sustainable in every contingency,
e.g. a particular  may not be implementable by the government over a long period if individuals nd
optimal to y from money massively.26
Now, in deriving a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the feasibility of the HIP similar to (24), we
must take into account that the time of the eventual reform is determined endogenously. Apart from
this observation, the problem is similar in its basic aspects to the case with exogenous T: I collect the
main insights of this case in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Assume (34) and (35) hold. Then, the reform is never executed if (i) the reaction point
x is su¢ ciently low, or (ii) there is no post-reform hysteresis. Otherwise, the HIP, that triggers the
reform, is possible.
Proof. (i) In deriving the counterpart of (24), it is helpful to consider the following two steps. First,
compute the ination rate sequence associated with the HIP using (23), from t = 2 up to the rst date
at which the ination threshold would be violated in the absence of a reform and denote that date by
T  + 1. The solution for T  is implicitly given by the following correspondence
mT 1
mT      1 < x 
mT
mT+1      1; [mt =  
I (mt 1) for t = 2; :::; T  + 1]
where mTmT+1  , by construction, is an increasing function of T
.
Second, use T  in (22) to compute the sign of inf

	It
	T 1
t=1
  : If it is positive, then a speculative
hyperinationary path that unchains the reform is possible. Since inf

	It
	T 1
t=1
is an increasing function
26This illustrates an important feature of this model. For some parameter-conguration, we can nd a non-empty set of
s for which the status quo equilibrium is a possible equilibrium while the HIP necessarily triggers a reform since, otherwise,
the seigniorage-target at some point becomes unsustainable, which in turn means that ination can reach arbitrarily high
values just before the change of regime. Such a set is
h
N ;
(1 )(1 )
1 
i
: For some authors, see e.g. Marcet and Nicolini
(2003), and Gutiérrez and Vázquez (2004), this is a desirable property for a model of hyperinations, since the empirical
evidence suggests that these processes may be better understood as being inherently unstable along which ination explodes
without bound at an ever increasing rate.
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of T ; and T  increases (discretely) with x; we learn that there is a minimum x such that a HIP is only
possible for values of x above that lower bound.
(ii) Imagine that  = 0 or xL < 0 hold. The latter case implies that in equilibrium s = 0 for s  T :
In either case, we can write 	IT 1 = x
I
T : The shadow-value function associated with the no-crisis
equilibrium LIP, 	NT 1 (computed over an innite period), satises 	
N
T 1  	N1  ; with xNs > 0 for
s  T  + 1: Dene xNT =
mLIPT 1
mLIP
T  
  1 and xIT =
mHIPT 1
1    1, where mLIPT 1 and mHIPT 1 are the time
T  1 stocks of monetization associated with the respective extreme path. Then, it trivially follows that
xNT > x
I
T ; which implies that 	
I
T 1 < 	
N
T 1  ; and hence inf

	It
	T 1
t=1
   < 0: Thus, the reform
is never implemented.
The intuition behind these results is simple. A credible commitment by the government to switch from
a scal-dominance to an orthodox monetary-dominance one when the ination rate threatens to reach
a su¢ ciently high value will only prevent a speculative hyperination and, hence, the regime switch will
not take place in equilibrium, if the public understands that the government will not let the ination rate
to reach very high values before intervening or if it is able to implement a su¢ ciently restrictive monetary
policy so that the economy jumps to the full-level of monetization at the time of the reform. Yet, as
emphasized in section 2, these two conditions are widely violated in real hyperinationary episodes.
Figure 4 depicts three alternative scenarios. In the rst one, with xL > 0; the threshold x is set at a
su¢ ciently low level, xa; so that the reform is never implemented, i.e. inf

	It
	T(xa) 1
t=1
< . In the second
one, maintaining xL > 0; the government is assumed to react only when ination is su¢ ciently high, xb
(xb > xa) so that the eventual reform is e¤ective in stopping the hyperination but not in preventing
it, i.e. inf

	It
	T(xb) 1
t=1
> . In the last one, the government commits to a negative post-reform rate,
xL < 0; so that regardless the particular x (xc in the gure), the reform is never implemented.
One can also follow a similar strategy of treating a certain parameter of interest as exogenously given,
like x above, to shed light on a di¤erent channel through which scal conditions may a¤ect monetary
movements beyond that of an exogenous volume of seigniorage over the pre-reform period. Regarding
the di¤erent nature in the scal-monetary regime before and after the reforms implemented in several
European countries in the interwar period, Sargent (1986; p. 45-46) writes the following:
The hyperinations were each ended by restoring or virtually restoring covertibility to the dollar
or equivalently to gold. For this reason it is good to keep in mind the nature of the restrictions
that the adherence to the gold standard imposed on a government. Under the gold standard, a
government issued demand notes and longer-term debt it promised to convert into gold under certain
specied conditions, that is, on demand, for notes [...]. More important in practice, since usually a
government did not hold 100 percent reserves of gold, a governments notes and debts were backed
by the commitment of the government to levy taxes in su¢ cient amounts, given its expenditures, to
make good on its debt [...]. According to this view, what mattered was not the current government
decit but the present value of current and prospective future government decits.
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The money-backing mechanism described in section 3.2 clearly resembles the one highlighted by
Sargent and, hence, its success in stopping a continuos fall in the real value of money rests on the same
factor: the degree of governments scal solvency over the post-reform period. Thus a similar argument to
the one exploited before would follow: the government threat to implement a backing-scheme conditional
on a speculative ight from money will be e¤ective in precluding it if the public understands that the
volume of resources that the government can seize to back its currency is not too low.27
7 Concluding remarks
The model presented in this paper aims to reconcile several long-standing views on the causes and
dynamics of extreme hyperinationary processes with the objective of providing a simple theoretical
explanation of the main stylized facts observed during those episodes.
A central theme in the paper is how to make three of the most inuential stories in the literature
compatible with each other and, of course, with the empirical facts we are after. First, a high level of
scal pressure leading to relatively high levels of decit monetization is usually identied as a leading
cause of hyperinations. Indeed, stopping a hyperination usually involves, among other things, a drastic
reduction in seigniorage. Second, it is well understood that a seigniorage-based monetary rule may be
compatible with a multiplicity of ination equilibrium-paths, as this rule leaves the monetary aggregate
indeterminate. Private expectations are frequently thought as of being an important mechanism behind
hyperinationary processes, an argument that seems specially attractive to account for one of the most
robust stylized facts: the lack of a strong correlation between seigniorage (i.e. the scal fundamental)
and ination over the course of a hyperination. Third, for a large class of models widely studied in the
previous theoretical and empirical literature (namely, models incorporating a demand for real balances
à la Cagan), it is di¢ cult to accept an explanation for a hyperination based on rational self-fullled
prophecies, for the government commitment to eventually implement a regime-reform, abandoning the
scal-dominance regime, and to back its currency with taxes implies, rst, that rational speculative paths
are not possible, as shown by Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1983) and Nicolini (1996), and, second, that higher
volumes of seigniorage over that regime would be associated with more severe disinationary processes.
The mutual incompatibility of the above arguments with the hypothesis of rational expectations and
with the empirical evidence is not a new result. The solutions given to this problem in the previous
literature vary to a great extent. In some cases the rational expectations assumption is abandoned (e.g.
Marcet and Nicolini 2003, and Sargent et al. 2005) while in others the possibility of a scal-monetary
reform is left out of the picture (e.g. Bruno and Fischer 1990) or, even, the anticipation of such a reform
is blamed for being the cause of a hyperination (e.g. Bental and Eckstein 1990, and Paal 2000). The
approach taken in this paper follows a di¤erent route
27Marcet and Nicolini (2003) also devote some attention to this point, as they argue that the drastic fall in the stock of
real balances at the end of the hyperinationary episodes in the late 80s and early 90s, indeed, could have enabled the
Argentinian government to peg its currency to the dollar by reducing the required volume of reserves to do so.
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Based on some previous works on dynamic processes of nancial innovation, I study how the persis-
tence in the use of alternative means of transactions a¤ects the e¤ectiveness of an equilibrium selection
device similar to the one studied by Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1983) and Nicolini (1996). This is a natural
question in this context, for the experience of those countries which su¤ered extreme hyperinations
reveals a high degree of hysteresis in the demand for real money. Using a simple cash-and-credit model
that allows for persistence in the usage of credit, it is argued that the robustness, and the rather extreme
implications, of an argument à la Obstfeld and Rogo¤s follow directly from the assumption of instan-
taneous adjustment in the private demand for real money (i.e. no hysteresis). Once this assumption
is relaxed, the e¤ectiveness of the prospect of a future orthodox reform for ruling out hyperinationary
paths, speculative or fundamental, is an endogenous outcome. In particular, whether the governments
commitment to reform exerts any anti-inationary e¤ect before the time of its implementation, hinges on
a wide array of structural factors and policy choices. For example, a high volume of seigniorage collected
over the pre-reform period, a long period of government inactivity and a weak scal position after the
reform are likely to set down the necessary conditions for a hyperination. Further, when those variables
reach too high values the promise of a low-ination future may well be totally disregarded by the
public: no credible threat to reform will preclude a continuous ight from money and a hyperination
will be the unique possible outcome. When, in addition, individuals do not face important barriers
to access to the credit-technology and the e¤ects of the investments in this technology extend over a
longer horizon, an extreme speculative hyperination happens to be a true possibility, even if individuals
rationally expect a future drastic reform.
While the model o¤ers a theoretical basis compatible with the view of a hyperination as a bubble
phenomenon, it also provides some useful guidance in identifying the economic-policy conditions that
may lead to such a painful experience, for the conditions under which such paths are possible are not
arbitrary, as in some of the previous literature. Namely, only countries that, for some reason, are
advocated to rely on seigniorage in a signicant amount and/or for a su¢ ciently prolonged period are
likely to put themselves on the knife-edge. On the theoretical side, the model o¤ers a simple resolution to
the incompatibility problem among the three popular approaches aforementioned in a way that renders
it a useful tool to understand the empirical evidence. And it does so by including an ingredient which
can hardly be labelled as unrealistic or empirically irrelevant: the existence of hysteresis in the degree of
monetization following the end of the hyperination.
28
BANCO DE ESPAÑA     36 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0607 
 
Appendix
Proof of the existence of [-shaped m-paths when  2  N ; I
Let us dene e	t as the time t shadow-value function associated with the following m-sequence
ms =

 I (ms 1) for s = 2; :::; t  1
 N (ms 1) for s = t; :::;1
It can be readily veried that (18) is su¢ cient for e	t to be bounded by 	Nt and 	It ; i.e. 	Nt < e	t < 	It ;
for t = 2; :::; T   1: To see this notice that for any t within this interval, e	t and 	Nt look similarly, as
both functions are dened under the assumption that no household is investing in the credit technology
from date (inclusive) on. However, as mt 1 under e	t is lower than under 	Nt ; (18) implies that every
element in the equilibrium ination sequence fxsgTs=t+1 is higher for e	t: When comparing e	t and 	It ;
notice that mt 1 is common for both functions, but ms for s  t is lower under 	It ; so the corresponding
equilibrium ination sequence fxsgTs=t+1 is higher for 	It than for e	t and, hence, e	t < 	It :
Let us rst consider the case in which e	2  : As  2  N ; I ; we learn that 	I1 > 	N1 >  must
hold, where the rst inequality follows from (18) and the second one holds by construction. Consider a
m-path such that mt =  N (mt 1) for t  2: Clearly such a path is an equilibrium one. First, e	2  
implies, by denition, that having invested in the credit technology at t = 1;no investing from period 2 on
is optimal. Second, the actual shadow-value function at t = 1 conditional on investing in that period and
no investing from that period on, 	1; must satisfy 	I1 > 	1 > 	
N
1 > ; so it is indeed optimal to invest
in the rst period. Then, consider the case in which e	2 > ; so that 	I2 > ; as well. As 	It < ; there
must exist, at least, one date t1  3 such that 	It1=1   > 	It1 : Let us denote the lowest possible t1 as
tmin1 : As e	t < 	It ; there exists also, at least, one date t2; with 3  t2  tmin1 ; such that 	It1=1   > 	It1 :
Let us denote the lowest possible t2 as tmin2 : Then, by looking forward, not investing from period t
min
2
on is optimal, conditional on having invested in every period t = 1; :::; tmin2   1: Looking backwards, ase	t >  for t = 1; :::; tmin2   1; we learn that the actual 	t satises 	t > e	t >  for t = 1; :::; tmin2   1;
so it is optimal to invest over that interval when it is anticipated that no new investments will be made
from tmin2 on. Thus, there is always, at least, one equilibrium path for any  2
 
N ; I

along which
the time-path of m has a [-shape and, hence, the equilibrium ination path depicts a \-shape over the
pre-reform period.
Also, notice that if I > N holds, then there can not exist any equilibrium with a \-shaped path
for m over the pre-reform period, i.e. situations in which the households coordinate to give up every
opportunity for investing in the credit technology up to some date between 2 and T   1 and to invest
from that particular date on. To see this, notice that a necessary condition for not investing in the rst
period is that 	N1  ; and, hence, an equilibrium \-shaped path for m requires   N . Also, for
investing from some date bt on, such that 2  bt  T   1; not having invested over the period running
from 1 to bt  1; the following condition must hold
b	t  T tX
s=1
ss 1bxt+s + T t+1T t
1   x
L  , 8t = bt; :::; T   1 (A1)
where
bxt+s = (1  ) (1  ) 1 s 11  + s 1mbt
(1  ) (1  ) 1 s1  + smbt    ; (A2)
where s = 1; :::; T   bt for some bt = 2; :::; T   1
and mbt = 1  bt (1 m0)
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By comparing (23) and (A2), and exploiting the fact that the shadow-value functions at any date t are
inversely related to mt, regardless of the evolution of m from that date on, we learn that
ΨIt > bΨt, ∀t = bt, ..., T − 1
Thus, if the necessary condition for a ∩-shaped m-path (A1) holds and ΨI is located within the time-
interval bt, ..., T − 1, then it must be the case that ΨI > θ. A stronger result can be obtained for the
alternative case in which ΨI is located before bt, since, in this case, the positive effect of a lower m on
the shadow-value function is reinforced by a positive effect coming from a longer horizon over which the
investment in the credit technology is expected to yield positive returns, i.e. strictly positive savings, so
that the following inequality must hold
inf
©
ΨIt
ªet−1
t=1
> sup
nbΨtoT=1
t=et
≥ θ
Therefore, regardless of the time-location of ΨI , the existence of a ∩-shaped m-path requires a level of
seigniorage α, such that αI < α ≤ αN , and, as a result, when αI > αN holds, the only class of non-
monotonic equilibrium m-paths are ∪-shaped, i.e., as the time of the reform comes closer, its prospect
exerts a positive effect on the demand for real balances. Q.E.D.
References
[1] Adam, K., G. W. Evans and S. Honkapojha (2005). Are Hyperinflation Paths Learnable?, unpub-
lished manuscript.
[2] Albanesi, S. (2006). “Inflation and Inequality,” Journal of Monetary Economics, forthcoming.
[3] Bental, B., and Z. Eckstein (1990). “The Dynamics of Inflation with Constant Deficit under Expected
Regime Change”, The Economic Journal, 100 (403), pp. 1245-1260.
[4] Blackburn, K., and M. Sola (1996). “Market Fundamentals versus Speculative Bubbles: A New Test
Applied to the German Hyperinflation”, International Journal of Finance and Economics, 1 (4),
pp. 303-317.
[5] Bruno, M., and S. Fischer (1990). “Seigniorage, Operating Rules and the High Inflation Trap”,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105 (2), pp. 353-374.
[6] Bruno, M., S. Fischer, E. Helpman, N. Liviatan and L. Meridor (1991). Lessons of Economic Sta-
bilization and Its Aftermath, The MIT Press: Cambridge (Mass.).
[7] Cagan, P. (1956). “The Monetary Dynamics of Hyperinflation”, in Milton Friedman (Ed.), Studies
in the Quantity Theory of Money, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
[8] Calvo, G., and C. Végh (1992). “Currency Substitution in Developing Countries: An Introduction”,
Revista de Análisis Economico, 7 (1), pp. 3-27.
[9] Catão, L., and M. Terrones (2005). “Fiscal Deficits and Inflation”, Journal of Monetary Economics,
52, pp. 529-544.
[10] Chang, R. (1994). “Endogenous Currency Substitution, Inflationary Finance, and Welfare”, Journal
of Money, Credit and Banking, 26 (4), pp. 903-916.
[11] Dornbusch, R., F. Sturzenegger and H. Wolf (1990). “Extreme Inflation: Dynamics and Stabiliza-
tion”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2, pp. 1-84.
30
 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA     38 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0607 
 
[12] Drazen, A., and E. Helpman (1990). “Inflationary Consequences of Anticipated Macroeconomic
Policies”, The Review of Economic Studies, 57 (1), pp. 147-164.
[13] Eckstein, Z., and L. Leiderman (1992). “Seigniorage and the Welfare Cost of Inflation: Evidence
from an Intertemporal Model of Money and Consumption”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 29
(3), pp. 389-410.
[14] Fischer, S., R. Sahay and C. A. Végh (2002). “Modern Hyper- and High Inflations”, Journal of
Economic Literature, 40 (3), pp. 837-880.
[15] Flood, R. P., and P. M. Garber (1980). “Market Fundamentals versus Price-level Bubbles: The First
Tests”, Journal of Political Economy, 88, pp. 745-770.
[16] Gutiérrez, M. J., and J. Vázquez (2004). “Explosive Hyperinflation, Inflation-Tax Laffer Curve,
and Modeling the Use of Money”, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 160 (2), pp.
311-326.
[17] Holtfrerich, C. L. (1986). The German Inflation. 1914-1923, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
[18] Hooker, M. A. (2000). “Misspecification versus Bubbles in Hyperinflation Data: Monte Carlo and
Interwar European Experience”, Journal of International Money and Finance, 19, pp. 583-600.
[19] Imrohoroglu, S. (1993). “Testing for Sunspot Equilibria in the German Hyperinflation”, Journal of
Economic Dynamics and Control, 17, pp. 289-317.
[20] Ireland, P. (1995). “Endogenous Financial Innovation and the Demand for Money”, Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking, 27 (1), pp. 106-123.
[21] Kamin, S. B., and N. R. Ericsson (2003). “Dollarization in Post-Hyperinflationary Argentina”,
Journal of International Money and Finance, 22, pp. 185-211.
[22] Kiguel, M. A. (1989). “Budget Deficits, Stability, and the Monetary Dynamics of Hyperinflation”,
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 21 (2), pp. 148-157.
[23] Kiguel, M. A., and P. A. Neumeyer (1995). “Seigniorage and Inflation: The Case of Argentina”,
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 27 (3), pp. 672-682.
[24] Leattau, M., and T. Van Zandt (2003). “Robustness of Adaptive Expectations as an Equilibrium
Selection Device”, Macroeconomic Dynamics, 7, pp. 89-118.
[25] Loyo, E. (2001). Tight Money Paradox on the Loose: A Fiscalist Hyperinflation, mimeo, JFK School
of Government, Harvard University.
[26] Lucas, R. E. and N. L. Stokey (1987). “Money and Interest in a Cash-in-Advance Economy”, Econo-
metrica, 55, pp. 491-513.
[27] Marcet, A., and J. P. Nicolini (2003). “Recurrent Hyperinflations and Learning”, American Eco-
nomic Review, 93 (5), pp. 1476-1498.
[28] Mondino, G., F. Sturzenegger and M. Tommasi (1996). “Recurrent High Inflation and Stabilization:
A Dynamic Game”, International Economic Review, 37 (4), pp. 981-996.
[29] Nichols, D. A. (1974). “Some Principles of Inflationary Finance”, Journal of Political Economy, 82
(2, part 1), pp. 423-430.
[30] Nicolini, J. P. (1996). “Ruling Out Speculative Hyperinflations. The Role of the Government”,
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 20, pp. 791-809.
31
BANCO DE ESPAÑA     39 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0607 
 
[31] Obstfeld, M., and K. Rogoff (1983). “Speculative Hyperinflations in Maximizing Models: Can We
Rule Them Out?”, Journal of Political Economy, 91 (4), pp. 675-687.
[32] Paal, B. (2000). “Destabilizing Effects of a Successful Stabilization: A Forward-Looking Explanation
of the Second Hungarian Hyperinflation”, Economic Theory, 15, pp. 599-630.
[33] Petrovic, P., Z. Bogetic and Z. Vujosevic (1999). “The Yugoslav Hyperinflation of 1992-1994: Causes,
Dynamics and Money Supply Process”, Journal of Comparative Economics, 27, pp. 335-353.
[34] Reinhart, C. M., K. S. Rogoff and M. A. Savastano (2003). Addicted to Dollars, NBER Working
Paper No. 10015.
[35] Reinhart, C. M., and M. A. Savastano (2003). “The Realities of Modern Hyperinflations”, IMF,
Financial and Development, June, pp. 20-23.
[36] Romer, D. (2001). Advanced Macroeconomics, New York: McGraw Hill.
[37] Sachs, J. (1987). “The Bolivian Hyperinflation and Stabilization”, American Economic Review,
P&P, 77 (2), pp. 279-283.
[38] Sachs, J. (1995). Do We Need an International Lender of Last Resort, Frank D. Graham Lecture,
Princeton University (April 20).
[39] Sargent, T. J. (1986). Rational Expectations and Inflation, New York: Harper&Row Publishers.
[40] Sargent, T. J., and N. Wallace (1981). “Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic”, Federal Reserve
Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, Fall.
[41] Sargent, T. J. and N. Wallace (1975). “‘Rational’ Expectations, the Optimal Monetary Instrument,
and the Optimal Money Supply Rule”, Journal of Political Economy, 83, pp. 241-254.
[42] — (1987). “Inflation and the Government Budget Constraint”, in A. Razin and E. Sadka (Eds.),
Economic Policy in Theory and Practice, London: Macmillan Press.
[43] Sargent, T. J., N. Williams and T. Zha (2005). Fiscal Determination of Hyperinflation, unpublished
manuscript.
[44] Uribe, M. (1997). “Hysteresis in a Simple Model of Currency Substitution”, Journal of Monetary
Economics, 40, pp. 185-202.
32
BANCO DE ESPAÑA     40 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0607 
 
Figure 1: Monetary base, seigniorage and inflation1
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Argentina 1987-1992
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1 Left scale: real balances and seigniorage computed using base money (M0) as percentage of the initial date value for 
real balances. Average seigniorage in the post-reform regime is computed as the simple mean of seigniorage for the 
following periods: Germany (Jan 1924 — Dec 1924), Argentina (Apr 1990 - Dec 1992), Bolivia (Mar 1986 — Nov 1987), 
Peru (Sep 1990 - Dec 1992). 
Right scale: natural log of gross inflation computed from wholesale prices (Germany) and CPI (Argentina, Bolivia and 
Peru). 
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Sources: Germany: Holtfrerich (1986) and Sargent (1986). Argentina: Boletín Estadístico, Banco 
Central de la República Argentina (several issues). Bolivia: Memoria, Banco Central de Bolivia 
(several issues). Perú: Boletín Mensual, Banco Central de Reserva del Perú (several issues). 
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Figure 2. Dynamic Laffer-curve (αI< αN) 
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Figure 3. Alternative i flation-paths for δ=0 
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Figure 4. Contingent reforms 
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Figure N1:  αN- αI as a function of δ 
 Parameter values:  m0 = 1, θ = 1.35, β = 0.8, xL = 0.1, γ = 0.15 
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Figure N2: αN- αI as a function of γ. 
 Parameter values: same as in Figure N1 with δ = 0.9 
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Fig. N5: Shadow-value functions (α=0.20)       Fig. N5A: LIP-Inflation and real balances         
   
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
Fig. N6: Shadow-value functions (α=0.34)       Fig. N6A: Multiple inflation and balances paths 
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Fig. N7: Shadow-value functions (α=0.40)       Fig. N7A: HIP-Inflation and real balances 
 
Parameter values (Figs. N5 to N7A): T = 10, m0 = 0.9, θ = 1.35, β = 0.8, xL = 0.1, γ= 0.15, δ = 0.9. 
Vertical axis: (natural log of) θ and V(i) which denotes the function Ψt associated with a λ-sequence such 
that λt = 1 for t = 1,..., i-1 and λt = 0 for t≥i . V(N) and V(I) denote, respectively, the shadow-value 
function associated with the LIP and HIP. Psi corresponds to the function ~  defined in the appendix. 
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